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Federal Wetland Jurisdiction and the Power To Regulate
Commerce: Searching for the Nexus
in Gerke Excavating
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts reviewing the constitutionality of federal wetland regulation
have an elephant in the living room. While congressional regulation of
intrastate wetlands may be indispensable to the preservation of our
nation’s environmental well-being, the basis for such power is a very
complicated issue. Courts have upheld such regulations as a valid
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power 1 but have failed to
conduct a thorough examination of the constitutionality of these
regulations in light of more recent Commerce Clause decisions. 2 The
Supreme Court has generally declined to confront the issue, 3 though it
may in two cases for which it has granted certiorari in the 2005–2006
term: Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers 4 and United
States v. Rapanos. 5
In United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 6 Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit wrote a strikingly brief opinion that is exemplary of the
heuristic reasoning courts use in reviewing the validity of federal wetland
1. See John C. Eastman, A Fistful of Denial: The Supreme Court Takes a Pass on
Commerce Clause Challenges to Environmental Laws, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 469.
2. The three major Commerce Clause cases most recently decided by the Supreme Court are
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Unfortunately, the two
leading Supreme Court cases on the reach of the CWA have done little to clear the muddied waters
of CWA jurisdiction.”); Eastman, supra note 1; Raymond Takashi Swenson, Continuing Chaos at
the Corps: The Turbulent State of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 47 ADVOC. 15, 16 (2004). The last
Supreme Court case to scrutinize federal wetland regulation did not confront the more difficult issue
of whether the Constitution authorizes federal regulation of intrastate wetlands with some
hydrological connection to waters that are navigable-in-fact. The case involved the narrower issue of
the “migratory bird rule,” which was a regulation promulgated by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers that asserted federal jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate wetlands solely on the basis of
occasional occupation by migratory birds. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001); see also discussion infra Part II.B.3.
4. 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005).
5. 376 F.3d 629, cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005).
6. 412 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2005).
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regulation. In this case, the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of the Federal Clean Water Act 7 as applied to intrastate wetlands with a
very tenuous connection to any navigable interstate waters. 8
This Note argues that in upholding the Clean Water Act, the court in
Gerke arrived at the correct holding, albeit with an inadequate analysis.
More specifically, this Note argues that under Gonzales, Morrison, and
Lopez, 9 federal wetland regulation does not cleanly fit into any of the
Commerce Clause’s three delineated categories of permissible
regulation—channels of commerce, instrumentalities or things in
commerce, or activities that substantially affect interstate commerce 10 —
and, therefore, cannot be upheld solely on the basis of the commerce
power. Instead, federal wetland regulation can survive modern
Commerce Clause scrutiny only under an alternative, or “at least more
nuanced,” conception of the commerce power that incorporates the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Justice Scalia enunciated such a
conception of the commerce power in his concurrence to the Court’s
most recent Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v. Raich. 11
This more nuanced conception of the commerce power recognizes
that federal regulation of intrastate wetlands is not legitimate with the
Commerce Clause as its only basis. As previously stated, wetland
regulation does not fit into the three categories of activities or things that
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause. However, the
enabling power of the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to
regulate intrastate wetlands as an essential component of the broader
federal regulation of interstate waters. Justice Scalia’s conception of the
interplay between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce
Clause suggests that Congress could regulate noneconomic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce where that noneconomic
activity falls within a broader regulatory scheme of economic activity. 12
This Note proposes that, by analogy, the Necessary and Proper Clause

7. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000)).
8. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.A.
9. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 608–09 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995); see discussion infra Part
II.A.6.
10. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 58–59.
11. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring); see discussion infra Part IV.B.
12. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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empowers Congress to regulate intrastate wetlands as part of its broader
scheme of regulating interstate waters as channels of commerce.
Part II of this Note first examines the development of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, giving a detailed explanation of where it stands
today and a brief survey of how it got there. Part II briefly explains what
wetlands are and the history of their regulation. Part III summarizes the
facts and the holding of the principal case, United States v. Gerke
Excavating, Inc. Part IV highlights the analysis missed by the principal
case and how federal wetland regulation could be legitimately justified
under Justice Scalia’s conception of the Commerce Clause as it relates to
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Part V gives a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Commerce Clause
This Section will briefly survey the history of the Commerce Clause
beginning from the first major Supreme Court cases, as this history is an
integral part of how the Court currently interprets the scope of this
provision.
1. The Marshall period
That the United States government is one of limited and enumerated
powers is a firmly rooted principle of American constitutional law. 13
Among Congress’s constitutional grants of authority is the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.” 14 The first major exercise of federal
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (“Every law enacted by Congress
must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
551 (characterizing the concept of enumerated powers as “first principles” of the Constitution);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 33 (1824) (“[T]he constitution of the United States is one
of limited and expressly delegated powers, which can only be exercised as granted, or in the cases
enumerated.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (“This government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”); Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism
and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 389 (2005).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also, Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2205 (“The Commerce
Clause emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself:
the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of Confederation.”); GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 (12th ed. 1991) (explaining that the commerce power was
“designed to promote a national market and curb Balkanization of the economy”).
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commerce power came without controversy in 1787 when Congress
passed the Interstate Commerce Act. 15 After the 1787 Act, nearly thirty
years passed before the Supreme Court first construed Congress’s
commerce power 16 in Gibbons v. Ogden. 17 Chief Justice Marshall’s
seminal opinion established that this power “is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution.” 18 Despite this broad
characterization, Marshall made clear that the power “may very properly
be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . . .
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.” 19
Significantly, Gibbons established that the Commerce Clause grants
Congress the authority to regulate channels of commerce. 20
Despite Marshall’s vigorous characterization of federal power to
regulate channels of commerce, he later refused to strike down a
Delaware statute that authorized the construction of a dam that
obstructed a navigable creek. 21 Marshall suggested that federal authority
over navigable waters is not absolute in the sense that a state could
incidentally regulate commerce so long as the regulation was not
repugnant to the commerce power. 22 Although this opinion focused on
15. 24 Stat. 379; see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942).
16. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553; PAUL R. BENSON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937–1970, at 9 (1970).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1.
18. Id. at 196.
19. Id. at 194–95. Chief Justice Marshall also stated, “It is not intended to say that these
words comprehend that commerce, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between
different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States.” Id. at 194.
20. Id. at 197 (“The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of
every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with
‘commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.’” (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)). Similarly, the concurring opinion stated, “When speaking of the power of
Congress over navigation, I do not regard it as a power incidental to that of regulating commerce; I
consider it as the thing itself; inseparable from it as vital motion is from vital existence.” Id. at 229
(Johnson, J., concurring).
21. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). The state statute
was sustained “even though the dam obstructed navigation of the creek by a vessel sailing under a
federal coasting license identical to that held by Gibbons.” BENSON, supra note 16, at 25. Chief
Justice Marshall stated,
It cannot be urged that the power to regulate commerce can interfere with the rights of the
states over the property within their boundaries. While the waters of the United States
belong to the whole people of the nation, this creek continued subject to the power of the
state in whose territory it rises.
Black-Bird Creek, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 249.
22. Black-Bird Creek, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 251–52.
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the “dormant” Commerce Clause 23 rather than on Congress’s affirmative
commerce power, it casts some doubt on any interpretation of Gibbons as
a carte blanche to Congress regarding its regulatory power over channels
of commerce.
2. The post-Marshall antebellum period
Most early Commerce Clause disputes after Gibbons focused not on
the limits of federal commerce power but rather on the validity of
“discriminatory state legislation”—legislation that restricts or burdens
interstate commerce, against the backdrop of this broad national
power. 24 Between 1837 and 1852, under the direction of Chief Justice
Taney, “[t]he Court . . . fell into what may best be described as a state of
confusion regarding . . . the commerce power.” 25 Following this socalled “state of confusion” and focus on the nature of the commerce
power, the Court’s attention turned to the subjects of that power. 26 In
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Court established a compromise that
gave to Congress exclusive authority to regulate commerce as to subjects
of a national concern and to states the limited authority to regulate local
matters, even if they had an effect on interstate commerce. 27 But during

23. Essentially, the “dormant” commerce power is the idea that the Commerce Clause itself
imposes a restriction on the states’ power to regulate commerce, giving the federal government
virtually exclusive jurisdiction. Professor Sunstein explains, “The Commerce Clause is both an
authorization to Congress and, more controversially, a self-executing prohibition on certain state
actions burdening interstate commerce.” Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1705 (1984). Exactly what the scope of the “dormant” Commerce Clause
is and what role it should play has been the subject of an ongoing and controversial debate since the
days of Chief Justice Marshall. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause To
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982).
24. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 553 (1995); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942); Lori J. Warner, The Potential
Impact of United States v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321,
326 (1997); J. Blanding Holman, IV, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 142 (1995).
25. BENSON, supra note 16, at 26 (referring to cases such as Thurlow v. Commonwealth (The
License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), where “the justices were badly divided in their
reasoning, and six of them wrote nine different opinions”).
26. BENSON, supra note 16, at 27. “[W]hen the nature of a power like this is spoken of . . . it
must be intended to refer to the subjects of that power, and to say they are of such a nature as to
require exclusive legislation by Congress.” Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319
(1851) (emphasis added).
27. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319; see also BENSON, supra note 16, at 35.

267

6LEE.FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/12/2006 12:32:52 PM

[2006

most of the second half of the nineteenth century, the Court had scant
occasion to examine the scope of Congress’s commerce power. 28
3. Reconstruction and a dramatic shift
In the decades leading up to the turn of the century, laissez-faire
economics had gradually prompted another shift in jurisprudence that
caused the Court to impose stifling limits on commerce power. To
achieve this end, the Court often applied formalistic distinctions 29 such
as distinguishing commerce from manufacturing, 30 or direct effects from
indirect effects on interstate commerce. 31 Then, in 1937, the Supreme
Court suddenly withdrew from its activist role in reviewing
congressional authority. 32 This marked the beginning of a long period
during which the commerce power grew into a powerful legislative force
with firm approbation from the Court. 33

28. See Matthew L. Pirnot, Note, United States v. Wilson: Did Interstate General
Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 361, 377 (1998) (“Until the late
nineteenth century, the Court remained relatively silent with respect to the dimensions of Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause, in part because the controversy over slavery prevented
consensus in exercising the power.”).
29. DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW: THE NEW
FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 160–61 (2005); Logan Everett Sawyer, III, Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and
Legal Change: Sociological Jurisprudence and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 59, 64 (2001) (“Clear examples of formal jurisprudence are Lochner-era Commerce Clause
cases.”). The principle behind the decisions of this period has been described as the concept of “dual
federalism,” whereby the federal government and the states were seen as coequal sovereigns with
mutually exclusive powers that could not overlap, the Tenth Amendment representing an affirmative
limit on the power of Congress. BENSON, supra note 16, at 59–60; DOERNBERG, supra at 160.
30. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (“Over interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of
Congress is ample, but the production of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of
local regulation.”); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895).
31. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908) (requiring “some real or substantial relation to or connection” to
commerce).
32. See BENSON, supra note 16, at 73–75. This change is generally thought to have been
precipitated in part by President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, in anticipating problems with New Deal
legislation, proposed a “court-packing plan,” whereby he could appoint six new justices to the Court.
Id.; see also Holman, supra note 24, at 142–43; David W. Scopp, Commerce Clause Challenges to
the Endangered Species Act: The Rehnquist Court’s Web of Confusion Traps More Than the Fly, 39
U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 790 (2005).
33. See DOERNBERG, supra note 29, at 163; Adler, supra note 13, at 390 (“For most of the
latter half of the twentieth century, the notion that there were justiciable limits on the scope of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power was a dead letter.”); Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 44
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 227 (2000) (“From 1937 until 1995, the Court never struck down an act
of Congress for exceeding its powers under the Commerce Clause.”); Michael P. Van Alstine, The
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4. The New Deal
This expansion of commerce power began with abandonment of the
formalistic distinctions the Court had previously applied to limit
congressional commerce power. 34 The Court revealed its new policy of
judicial deference in three major cases: NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co., 35 United States v. Darby, 36 and Wickard v. Filburn. 37 Significantly,
Jones & Laughlin Steel established that Congress has the power to
regulate intrastate activities that “have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.” 38
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court “departed from the distinction
between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects” 39 and held that although a steel
company’s conduct might only affect interstate labor relations
“indirect[ly] or remote[ly],” the industry as a whole would certainly have
a significant enough impact on interstate commerce to bring the conduct
within the purview of congressional authority. 40 This holding formed the
Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 807 n.88 (2002) (“For a prolonged period (from the
end of the Lochner era until quite recently), the possibility of substantive limits on Congress’s
Commerce Clause power was viewed as little more than theoretical.”).
For contemporary views of pre-1995 limitations on the Commerce Clause, see United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“When asked at oral argument if there
were any limits to the Commerce Clause, the Government was at a loss for words.”); GUNTHER,
supra note 14, at 93 (“After nearly 200 years of government under the Constitution, there are very
few judicially enforced checks on the commerce power.”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: A TEXTBOOK 122 (2d ed. 1979) (“A question that naturally arises, to one familiar with the
recent decisions, is that of what constitutional limitations, if any, still remain upon the commerce
power.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1988) (“The
Supreme Court has in recent years largely abandoned any effort to articulate and enforce internal
limits on congressional power—limits inherent in the grants of power themselves.”); Richard A.
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1387 (1987) (“[T]oo
much water has passed over the dam for there to be a candid judicial reexamination of the
Commerce Clause that looks only to first principles.”).
34. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
35. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
36. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
37. 317 U.S. 111 (1941).
38. 301 U.S. at 37.
39. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995) (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301
U.S. at 36–38).
40. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41–43. The Court stated,
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the
question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. Because there may be
but indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of
local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that other industrial activities
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basis of what is now known as the “substantial effects” test. 41 Though
Jones & Laughlin Steel opened the floodgates for broad federal
commerce power, the Court expressed an important caveat that
Rehnquist-era Supreme Court Justices would later emphasize:
[T]he scope of this power must be considered in the light of our dual
system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to
embrace them . . . would effectually obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government. 42

Following Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court in United States v.
Darby “recognized the power of Congress . . . to declare that an entire
class of activities affects commerce.” 43 This principle would allow
Congress to regulate local activities as long as they exerted an effect on
interstate commerce when viewed as a class, and it also formed the basis
for the expansive rule articulated in Wickard v. Filburn. 44
Wickard, decided the same year as Darby, set out a holding that has
been referred to as the “high water mark” in federal commerce power. 45
This case involved a wheat farmer who argued that certain
amendments 46 to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 47 were
unconstitutional as applied to him because the Act extended federal
authority to regulate wheat that was grown entirely for the purposes of

do not have such a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make the
presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern.
Id. at 41.
41. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. Essentially, the “substantial effects” test puts an activity
within the scope of Commerce Clause regulation if that activity exerts a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. For further explanation, see infra Part II.A.6.b.
42. 301 U.S. at 37, cited in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; id. at 585 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 309 (1981). Similar
to this language in Jones & Laughlin Steel, Justice Cardozo had previously noted that “[t]here is a
view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in
the activities of commerce.” A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
43. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968) (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 120–21 (1941)).
44. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
45. DOERNBERG, supra note 29, at 162; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (characterizing
Wickard as “the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity”).
46. 55 Stat. 203.
47. 52 Stat. 31 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1521 (2000)).
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his own consumption. 48 In upholding the Act, the Court introduced what
has been called the “aggregation principle,” 49 which allows Congress to
regulate a class of activities that have little or no effect on interstate
commerce individually, but which exert a substantial effect on commerce
in the aggregate. 50 After Wickard, the Court allowed Congress to expand
federal control into areas such as civil rights, 51 criminal law, 52 and
environmental law. 53
In just 200 years, the scope of the Commerce Clause had evolved
from Chief Justice Marshall’s healthy ox, to a caged little pet, to a
monstrous and uncontrollable beast. This set the stage for a surprising
return to judicial scrutiny of Commerce Clause legislation in United
States v. Lopez. 54 This evolution also set a precarious stage for the
Court’s wrestle with the principle of dual sovereignty.
5. Federalism
Despite the Court’s refusal to impose internal limits on the
commerce power (in other words, limits inherent within the Commerce
Clause), 55 it eventually found external limits: namely, the Tenth
Amendment. In National League of Cities v. Usery, decided in 1976, 56
the Court held that “the Tenth Amendment acted as a substantive limit on
the commerce power.” 57 This holding imposed an external restriction on
48. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118.
49. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring); Scopp, supra note 32, at 798.
50. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28 (“That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.”); see also Arthur B. Mark, III, Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: A
Survey, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 671, 679–80 (2004); Pirnot, supra note 28, at 379–80; Warner, supra
note 24, at 328–29.
51. For cases upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the commerce power,
see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964). For cases upholding congressional prohibition of discrimination in public transportation
under the commerce power, see Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Henderson v. United
States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Mitchell v. United States,
313 U.S. 80 (1941).
52. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
53. See discussion infra Part II.B.
54. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see infra Part II.A.6.
55. See TRIBE, supra note 33, at 297.
56. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
57. Warner, supra note 24, at 331. In National League of Cities, the Court affirmed that “an
express declaration of this limitation [on the commerce power] is found in the Tenth Amendment.”
426 U.S. at 842.
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congressional commerce power based on the principle of dual
sovereignty—a principle external to the Commerce Clause itself. The
Court proved to be somewhat schizophrenic regarding this external limit
on the commerce power when, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 58 it overruled National League of Cities not long after
it was decided. In 1992, the Court returned to enforcing external, statesovereignty limits on the commerce power but did not expressly overrule
Garcia. 59 While it is uncertain how much weight federalism still carries
in the Commerce Clause arena, it certainly has not been forgotten. 60
6. 1995–present: Lopez, Morrison, and Gonzales
a. Facts and background. The Court’s abstinence from enforcing
internal limits and ambivalence in enforcing external limits created a
state such that its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez 61 shocked the
legal community. 62 For the first time in more than half a century, 63 the
58. 469 U.S. 528, 531, 556 (1985) (stating that “the principal and basic limit on the federal
commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action—the built-in restraints that our system
provides through state participation in federal governmental action”). National League of Cities,
itself, overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), a relatively recent precedent. See Nat’l
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 853–54.
59. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). Justice O’Connor based the
limitation on the “spirit of the Tenth Amendment.” Garcia, 469 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). In New York, the Court explained this so-called “spirit” of the Tenth Amendment:
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is
essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the
Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to
the States.
505 U.S. at 156–57 (emphasis added).
60. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568–84 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Gun-Free School Zones Act should be struck down on considerations of federalism
rather than on any inherent limits on the commerce power). For a thorough discussion of the ongoing
debate as to whether the Tenth Amendment is a substantive limit on federal power, or merely a
truism, see John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle?: The Tenth Amendment Since United
States v. Darby, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 445 (1996).
61. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
62. See, e.g., Cary B. Davis, The Commerce Clause: Border Crossing + Church Burning =
Interstate Commerce (A Formula for Federalizing Common Law State Crimes): United States v.
Ballinger, 57 FLA. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2005); Eastman, supra note 1, at 471; E. Thomas Sullivan,
Judicial Sovereignty: The Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 171 (2003)
(reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES (2002)); Paul Tzur, Comment, I Know Economic Activity When I See Economic
Activity: An Operational Overhaul of the Measure by Which Federal Criminal Conduct Is Deemed
“Economic,” 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1105–06 (2004).
63. See Holman, supra note 24, at 139; Warner, supra note 24, at 323.
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Court declared that Congress had exceeded its power to legislate under
the Commerce Clause by enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 64
Some commentators questioned the shelf-life of Lopez, 65 but, five years
later in United States v. Morrison, 66 the Court again declared that a
statute overreached Congress’s commerce power and affirmed its
willingness to enforce limits on that power. However, a more recent
decision, Gonzales v. Raich, 67 casts doubt on the viability of the Lopez
and Morrison decisions, leaving this area of law in a state of
uncertainty. 68
At issue in Lopez was section 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, 69 which subjected to federal criminal prosecution “any
individual [who] knowingly . . . possess[ed] a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” 70
The Court found that the Act exceeded Congress’s authority to regulate
commerce because it was “a criminal statute that by its terms [had]
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise.” 71
In Morrison, the challenged legislation was a provision of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which gave victims of gendermotivated violence a civil remedy in federal court. 72 The Court found
the statute beyond the purview of the Commerce Clause because “[t]he

64. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990) (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921–22).
65. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 141 (1995) (“[T]he impact of
the [Lopez] decision on broader questions of federal power will be limited.”); Deborah Jones Merritt,
The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 693 (1996) (“As a practical matter,
Lopez has deprived Congress of very little power.”).
66. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also Lilly Santaniello, Commerce Clause Challenges to the
Endangered Species Act’s Regulation of Intrastate Species on Private Land, 10 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 43 (2003).
67. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
68. See Craig M. Bradley, What Ever Happened to Federalism?, 41 TRIAL 52 (2005) (“[T]he
Court strangled in its infancy the so-called federalism revolution that began a mere 10 years ago.”);
Pamela A. MacLean, In Focus: Circuit Court Review: Circuits Split on Wetlands Control, NAT’L
L.J., Aug. 15, 2005, at S1. Doubts cast by Gonzales are accentuated by the fact that it was a six-tothree decision, whereas Lopez and Morrison were more sharply divided five-to-four decisions. A
fact that further weakens the precedent value of Lopez and Morrison is that two of the three justices
in favor of declaring the Controlled Substances Act (in Gonzales) as beyond the purview of the
commerce power, will no longer be on the Court when future Commerce Clause cases are decided.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994), invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369 to 3009-370 (1996).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994).
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
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regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has
always been the province of the States.” 73
Finally, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court addressed a challenge to the
Controlled Substances Act, which imposed federal criminal penalties on
anyone caught in the unauthorized manufacturing, dispensing,
distributing, or possessing of a controlled substance. 74 Contrary to what
may have been expected after Lopez and Morrison, the Court rejected the
constitutional challenges to the Act. 75 The Court stated that “case law
firmly establishes Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities
that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.” 76
While these three cases present a doctrine that can be difficult to
apply consistently, 77 the doctrine itself can be summarized with some
clarity. As a preliminary matter, in each of the three cases the Court
explained that the activities subject to congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause fall into three categories: (1) channels of interstate
commerce; (2) instrumentalities, persons, or things in interstate
commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect or have a substantial
relation to interstate commerce. 78 Facts and circumstances before the
Court in each case afforded it an opportunity to examine only the third
and most controversial category: the “substantial effects test.” 79
b. The substantial effects test. The Court emphasized four factors to
examine in determining whether an activity could be regulated under this
third category. 80 First, the Court emphasized that for an activity to

73. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2000).
75. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215 (2005).
76. Id. at 2205.
77. Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 616 (2001).
78. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09; United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
79. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
80. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205–15; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–
68. Regarding the “substantial effects” test, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gonzalez noted
that “the power . . . cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. . . . Congress’s regulatory
authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and
Proper Clause.” Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also id.
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“substantially affect” interstate commerce, the activity should be
economic in nature. 81 The Court made a broad declaration that “[w]here
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.” 82 In an attempt to refine this
test, the Gonzales majority defined “economic” as “the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities.” 83 Applying the
aggregation principle articulated in Wickard, 84 the Gonzales majority
stated that in the case of inherently economic activity, the Court “need
not determine whether [the] activities, taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a
‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” 85 However, while the fact that
at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing her prior dissenting opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 585–86 (1985)); id. at 2230–31 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
In Gonzales, the majority began its opinion by stating that “[t]he question presented in this
case is whether the [Necessary and Proper Clause] includes the power to prohibit the local
cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law,” but did not explicitly address
the matter further. Id. at 2198–99. Justice Scalia argued that this fact rendered the majority’s
“substantial effects” category “incomplete because the authority to enact laws necessary and proper
for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.” Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor did
not explicitly discuss how this affected her analysis, and Justice Thomas suggested a resurrection of
Chief Justice Marshall’s view of what is necessary and proper: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.” Id. at 2230–31 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316, 421 (1819)). The implications of the Necessary and Proper Clause on the commerce
power are discussed in detail in Part IV.B.
81. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–61 (holding that because the Gun Free School Zones Act
regulated noneconomic activity, it could not be subject to Wickard’s aggregation principle); see also
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205–06, 2211 (upholding the Controlled Substances Act because “[l]ike the
farmer in Wickard, respondents [were] cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for
which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market . . . the activities regulated by the CSA
are quintessentially economic”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–11, 613 (striking the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity”).
82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; see also Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2210; id. at 2216 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
83. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). Justice O’Connor described the majority’s explanation as a “breathtaking”
definition that “threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach.” Id.
at 2224 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
84. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
85. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (citations omitted). It bears emphasis that in determining
whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the aggregation principle is only
applicable to economic activities. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560–61; Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands,
Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of
Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 35 (1999).
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an activity is economic is sufficient under the test, it apparently is not
necessary that it be an economic activity if the effect of the activity is
economic in nature: “[E]ven if [the] activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.” 86
A point mentioned by the Gonzales majority, and heavily
emphasized by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion, is that an activity
need not be economic in nature if it is “merely one of many ‘essential
part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.’” 87 This means that regulation of a noneconomic activity can
be sustained under the substantial effects test if it is a necessary
component in a larger scheme of economic regulation. 88
To summarize, in order for federal legislation to pass muster as a
valid exercise of the commerce power under the substantial effects test, it
must regulate an activity that: (1) is economic in nature, (2) has a
significant economic impact on interstate commerce, or (3) is regulated
as an “essential” component of an overall scheme of economic regulation
that is itself valid.
In determining whether the legislation is valid, the Court considers
three other factors. First, the Court looks for a “jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity] in
question affects interstate commerce.” 89 Essentially, this is a technical
aspect of legislation that limits the triggering of federal jurisdiction to
circumstances that involve interstate commerce. For example,
committing federal securities fraud requires the use of a “manipulative or
deceptive device” that is employed using “any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of the [U.S.] mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange.” 90 The presence of a jurisdictional element
86. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2205–06 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
87. Id. at 2210, 2211 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); id. at 2217–20 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
88. An illustration of this principle can be found in Gonzales, where Justice Scalia stated that
“the subdivided class of activities defined by the Court of Appeals was an essential part of the larger
regulatory scheme. . . . Congress could reasonably conclude that its objective of prohibiting
marijuana from the interstate market ‘could be undercut’ if those activities were excepted from its
general scheme of regulation.” Id. at 2210, 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561).
89. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–62; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
90. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2000) (emphasis added).
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is not dispositive under the substantial effects test but is, rather, one
factor to consider. This factor weighed into the invalidation of the
legislation in Lopez and Morrison, 91 but the Gonzales majority did not
mention it.
The third factor addressed by the Court is whether the regulation in
question is supported by legislative findings of fact “regarding [the]
effect [of the regulated activity] on interstate commerce.” 92 The Court
looks for direct evidence in the legislative history that the activity being
regulated actually affects interstate commerce. As with the jurisdictional
element, findings of fact are part of the analysis, but not necessary for the
Court to uphold legislation. 93
Finally, the Court considers whether the activity’s connection to
commerce is so tenuous that the Court “would have to pile inference
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the
sort retained by the states.” 94 This factor examines the length and
integrity of the causal chain between the regulated activity and the
purported effects on interstate commerce. A weak connection weighs
against the validity of the legislation.
To summarize, for legislation to be a valid exercise of the commerce
power under the substantial effects test, it must have some connection to
economic activity. If the economic connection can be established, other
factors a court may consider include whether the legislation has a
jurisdictional element, the existence and contents of congressional
findings of fact, and the significance of the connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce. While Lopez, Morrison, and

91. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–63.
92. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612, 614.
93. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (“While congressional findings are certainly helpful . . .
particularly when the connection to commerce is not self-evident . . . the absence of particularized
findings does not call into question Congress’ authority to legislate.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 1631–32.
In Morrison, the Court invalidated the statute at issue despite voluminous findings indicating that the
regulated activity actually had a significant effect on interstate commerce, stating that “the existence
of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation.” 529 U.S. at 614.
94. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The example of attenuated reasoning cited by the Court was that
“(1) gun-related violence is a serious problem; (2) that problem, in turn, has an adverse effect on
classroom learning; and (3) that adverse effect on classroom learning, in turn, represents a
substantial threat to trade and commerce.” Id. at 565 (citing id. at 623 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see
also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–16 (“The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the butfor causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon
interstate commerce.”).
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Gonzales have articulated a fairly straightforward doctrine, the cases
have not left a predictable guide for application of the doctrine. 95
Despite the difficulty in applying this doctrine, this Note concludes that
the substantial effects test, at least without the support of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, cannot sustain Congress’s assertion of federal
wetland jurisdiction. 96 This conclusion incorporates this principle as
analogized from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gonzales.
c. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Gonzales. While Justice Scalia
agreed with the Court’s holding in Gonzales, he had a slightly different,
or “at least more nuanced,” conception of why the holding was right. 97
In addition to the power “[t]o regulate Commerce,” 98 the Constitution
vests Congress with the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 99 This power is
found in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Justice Scalia found the legislation at issue to be within Congress’s
power by virtue of the interplay between the commerce power and the
necessary and proper power. 100 He stated that the Necessary and Proper
Clause allows Congress to regulate, with its commerce power, intrastate
noneconomic activities that are “an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activit[ies] were regulated.” 101 Justice Scalia
95. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the test as a “rootless
and malleable standard”); Alex Kreit, Comment, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the
States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1825 (2003) (“[T]he current ‘substantial effects’
doctrine makes a clear analysis difficult.”).
96. See discussion infra Part IV.
97. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
99. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
100. In Lopez, Justice Thomas also recognized the synergy created by the interplay of the two
clauses, but characterized the utility of this interplay as being very limited. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“After all, if Congress may regulate all matters
that substantially affect commerce, there is no need for the Constitution to specify that Congress may
enact bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of weights and measures, cl. 5, or
punish counterfeiters of United States coin and securities, cl. 6.”).
101. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
The Gonzales majority articulated a similar principle but did not explicitly tie it to the Necessary and
Proper Clause. See id. at 2205–15. This principle was also recognized by the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Deaton, though the court did not explicitly invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause
to achieve its result. 332 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The power over navigable waters also
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explained that this principle “referred to those cases permitting the
regulation of intrastate activities ‘which in a substantial way interfere
with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.’” 102 For example, in
Gonzales Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that Congress could
prohibit intrastate marijuana possession. However, Justice Scalia argued
that congressional power to regulate intrastate marijuana possession
arose not by virtue of the commerce power alone, but because the
regulation was essential to the success of the overall federal scheme
regulating controlled substances. 103 Justice Scalia further explained that
for a court reviewing this kind of legislation, “[t]he relevant question is
simply whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.” 104 This Note
will explain how federal wetland regulation can be properly sustained
under this application of the Necessary and Proper Clause to the
Commerce Clause. 105
B. Federal Wetlands Regulation
Before discussing the Commerce Clause as applied to federal
wetland regulations, this Section will explain what wetlands are, briefly
summarize the legislation that has affected wetlands, and discuss the
current legislation that makes wetland regulation controversial.
1. The meaning of “wetland”
Wetlands elicit very different images from different people. Some
see wetlands as sacred ground, as places of hallowed sanctuary. Henry
David Thoreau, the “patron saint of swamps,” 106 wrote, “If there were
Druids whose temples were the oak groves, my temple is the swamp.” 107
carries with it the authority to regulate nonnavigable waters when that regulation is necessary to
achieve Congressional goals in protecting navigable waters.”).
102. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)).
103. Id. at 2219 (“That simple possession is a noneconomic activity is immaterial to whether it
can be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation.”).
104. Id. at 2217 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)).
105. See discussion infra Part IV.
106. RODNEY JAMES GIBLETT, POSTMODERN WETLANDS: CULTURE, HISTORY, ECOLOGY 229
(1996).
107. William L. Howarth, Imagined Territory: The Writing of Wetlands, 30 NEW LITERARY
HIST. 509, 527 (1999). For some entertaining and romantic views on wetlands, see GIBLETT, supra
note 106; BARBARA HURD, STIRRING THE MUD: ON SWAMPS, BOGS, AND HUMAN IMAGINATION
(2001).
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Others may see wetlands as “places of darkness, disease and death,
horror and the uncanny, melancholy and the monstrous,” 108 nothing
more than “a hideaway for scoundrels, debtors, enchanted women . . .
runaway slaves, and hermits.” 109 This apprehensive view of wetlands is
dramatically reflected in Chief Justice Marshall’s statement about a
creek: “It is one of those sluggish reptile streams, that do not run but
creep, and which, wherever it passes, spreads its venom, and destroys the
health of all those who inhabit its marshes.” 110 Personal views aside,
wetlands are a vital component of our natural environment and
ecosystems. 111
So just what is a wetland? It has been said that “[a] wetland is
whatever a competent expert says it is,” 112 and that “the definition of
wetlands [is] more a matter of politics than science,” 113 which, for the
purposes of this Note, it is. The agency charged with enforcing wetland
regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”), has defined
wetlands as follows:
The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar
areas. 114

108. GIBLETT, supra note 106, at xi.
109. HURD, supra note 107, at 46.
110. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 249 (1829).
111. Wetlands serve many functions: some wetlands store flood waters, some help to control
erosion, and they all generally provide a unique habitat for certain plants and animals. Further, some
recharge underground aquifers, some help remove pollutants from water, and they also provide
many different types of recreation. See United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1210–11 (7th Cir.
1979); 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (July 19, 1977); COMMITTEE ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES ET AL.,
COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 27–34 (2001); PAUL D.
CYLINDER, ET AL., WETLANDS REGULATION 2 (1995); S.M. HASLAM, UNDERSTANDING WETLANDS:
FEN, BOG AND MARSH 22–41 (2003); JON KUSLER & TERESA OPHEIM, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND
HERITAGE: A PROTECTION GUIDE 1–10 (2d ed. 1996); WILLIAM M. LEWIS, JR., WETLANDS
EXPLAINED: WETLAND SCIENCE, POLICY, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 41–64 (2001); Lee Evan
Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water? The Controversy over Section 404, Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 455–56 (1977); Holman,
supra note 24, at 205–06; Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, but Hardly
Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 71–73 (1996).
112. HASLAM, supra note 111, at 1.
113. LEWIS, supra note 111, at 26.
114. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(8)(b) (2005).
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2. Federal wetland legislation, historically
Although humans have devised a number of ingenious ways to abuse
and destroy the environment, the primary damage to wetlands has come
directly from draining, filling, and converting wetlands to dry land 115 —
euphemistically referred to as “reclamation.” 116 Early American
colonists quickly began draining wetlands with “small hand-dug
ditches,” and this progressed during the country’s period of Westward
expansion. 117 In 1850 Congress passed the Swamp Land Act, 118 which
allowed the states to “reclaim the swamp and overflowed lands
therein.” 119 The federal government’s anti-wetland policy reached its
high-water mark in the early 20th century when it, “in essence, provided
free engineering services to farmers to drain wetlands” and “shared the
cost of drainage projects.” 120 But eventually, the growing body of
information on wetlands prompted a change in policy. The shift began in
1934 when Congress passed the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act, 121
which imposed a cost on hunting waterfowl and allocated some of the
proceeds for acquiring wetlands to be set aside as “Waterfowl Production
Areas.” 122
Before the colonists’ “reclamation” began, wetlands comprised about
225 million acres of United States territory. 123 Researchers currently
estimate that total wetland acreage has been reduced by about fifty

115. J. Gardiner, Pressures on Wetlands, in WETLAND MANAGEMENT 47, 50–53 (R.A.
Falconer & P. Goodwin eds., 1994).
116. See P.B. Williams, From Reclamation to Restoration—Changing Perspectives in Wetland
Management, in WETLAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 115, at 1–3 (“It is perhaps in pursuit of an
overriding rationalization that the advocates of resource exploitation succeeded in popularizing their
activities as ‘reclaiming’ rather than ‘claiming,’ implying that all wetlands were formerly dry lands
and that mankind was merely correcting nature’s mistake.”).
117. THOMAS E. DAHL & GREGORY J. ALLORD, NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY ON WETLAND
RESOURCES, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, HISTORY OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED
STATES, http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/history.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
118. Id. The first Swamp Land Act was passed in 1849 and only applied to Louisiana. In 1850,
the Swamp Land Act was made applicable to twelve other states. Id.
119. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519.
120. DAHL & ALLORD, supra note 117.
121. Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp (Duck Stamp) Act, ch. 71, 48 Stat. 452 (1934) (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 718a–718j (2000)).
122. 16 U.S.C. § 718d(c).
123. KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 1; NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., RCA ISSUE BRIEF #4, WETLANDS VALUES AND TRENDS (Nov. 1995),
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/land/pubs/ib4text.html#losses.
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percent. 124 The enormous loss of wetlands eventually prompted further
reaction from the federal government to regulate in this area. 125 In 1972
Congress enacted the landmark Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which had
the stated purpose to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 126 Congress enacted this
legislation pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause. 127 This
Act was a reflection of the public’s growing concern for wetlands.
Wetlands eventually gained a very high priority on political agendas. The
Bush (Sr.) and Clinton Administrations adopted and endorsed a national
policy known as “no net loss,” 128 which refers to the idea that “wetlands
lost in one location can be replaced by wetlands created at another
location.” 129 Federal environmental protection generally has grown over
the years such that currently it “arguably represents the most expansive
assertion of federal authority.” 130
3. The controversy
Wetland regulations, specifically section 404 of the CWA, 131 have
created a controversy as to how far the federal government can extend its
authority over non-navigable waters through the Commerce Clause.
Commerce Clause jurisdiction over waters that are navigable-in-fact is

124. COMMITTEE ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, ET AL., supra note 107, at 1; WETLANDS
VALUES AND TRENDS, supra note 123; see also United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d
804, 806 (7th Cir. 2005) (“There are believed to be more than 100 million acres of wetlands in the
lower 48 states.” (citation omitted)).
125. See KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 1–4. Notably, the federal government was not
actively involved in any kind environmental protection before the late 1960s when it began enacting
a number of environmental statutes. See Adler, supra note 13, at 381–82 (“[M]ost environmental
concerns were addressed at the state and local level, if they were addressed at all.”). The latter half
of the twentieth century witnessed a complete turnaround in United States environmental policy;
“[b]etween the 1850s and 1970s, the federal government was intent on eliminating wetlands. Since
then, it has been equally intent on preserving them.” LEWIS, supra note 111, at 3–4.
126. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000)).
127. See Adler, supra note 13, at 404 (“[W]hen the various environmental statutes were
adopted, the underlying assumption was that the Commerce Clause ‘grants virtually carte blanche
authority to Congress to legislate for environmental protection.’” (quoting Denis Binder, The
Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147,
148 (2001))).
128. See KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 3–4.
129. LEWIS, supra note 111, at 16. For a sharp criticism of the inadequacy of the “no net loss”
policy, see id. at 16–17.
130. See Adler, supra note 13, at 387.
131. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
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uncontroversial and was established nearly two-hundred years ago. 132
Section 404 of the CWA, which “prohibits the discharge of dredge or fill
materials into ‘navigable waters’ without a permit,” 133 has raised the
controversy as to how far federal jurisdiction extends to waters that are
not navigable-in-fact.
“Navigable waters,” as used in the statute, is a term of art. What,
exactly, constitutes these “navigable waters” over which Congress and
the Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) 134 claims jurisdiction is the
center of the CWA’s controversy. The CWA cryptically defines
“navigable waters” as “waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas.” 135 Pursuant to administrative authority, the Corps
enacted regulations defining “waters of the United States” to include
“[w]etlands adjacent to” other waters listed in the section. 136 It further
defines “adjacent” as “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.” 137
Federal jurisdiction over directly adjacent wetlands was upheld by a
unanimous Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, 138 but this was a decade before the Court’s return to a critical
review of federal commerce power.
The Corps also enacted what became known as the “migratory bird
rule,” which extended federal jurisdiction into intrastate waters that could
“be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties . . . [or]
by other migratory birds which cross state lines.” 139 The “migratory bird
rule” effectively authorized federal regulation over non-navigable
intrastate wetlands, including man-made ponds that certain birds
happened to land in occasionally. 140
By the time the Court reviewed the “migratory bird rule” in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of

132. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824); Matthew B. Baumgartner,
Note, SWANCC’s Clear Statement: A Delimitation of Congress’s Commerce Clause Authority To
Regulate Water Pollution, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2141 (2005).
133. Holman, supra note 24, at 165.
134. The Army Corps of Engineers is the federal agency charged with enforcing section 404
of the CWA. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; see also Johnson, supra note 111, at 68.
135. CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
136. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(7) (2005).
137. Id. § 328.3(c).
138. 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
139. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (formerly codified at 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3) (1999)).
140. See id.
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Engineers (“SWANCC ”), 141 Congress’s commerce power had been cast
in a new light under the Lopez and Morrison decisions. In fact, the
SWANCC opinion, like the Lopez and Morrison opinions, was delivered
by Chief Justice Rehnquist with an identical five-to-four division. 142 In
SWANCC, the Court held that the “migratory bird rule” was not
authorized by the CWA, suggesting that the provision went beyond the
power granted by the Commerce Clause. 143 Although decided on a
statutory basis, the SWANCC holding can be characterized as a
constitutional ruling because, as explained by Judge Posner,
The arguments are interchangeable, since the only reason . . . to doubt
the validity of the regulation is the principle that the meaning of a
statute or a regulation can be stretched where that is necessary to avoid
its being held unconstitutional. The idea here would be that the Corps
of Engineers would prefer a bobtailed regulation to none if that is the
choice forced on it by the Constitution. 144

The SWANCC Court suggested that in order for federal jurisdiction
to exist over wetlands, there should be a “significant nexus between the
wetlands and ‘navigable waters.’” 145 But because the Court did not draw
a very bright line, it fostered a division among the lower courts as to
where that line should be drawn on the continuum that ranges from
wetlands directly adjacent to navigable waters, to wetlands with a much
more distant or tenuous physical connection to navigable waters. 146
Most jurisdictions have given SWANCC a narrow reading that restricts

141. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
142. In all three cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
O’Connor, and Thomas while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer wrote or joined in
dissenting opinions. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995).
143. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (“We thus read the [CWA] as [not authorizing the ‘migratory
bird rule’] to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the Corps’]
interpretation.”).
144. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2005); see also
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”).
145. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167; see also Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d
704, 710 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005); In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 347
(5th Cir. 2003).
146. See United States v. Adam Bros. Farming, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183–84 (C.D.
Cal. 2004); Adler, supra note 13, at 419; Maclean, supra note 68, at S1.
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only federal regulation over isolated intrastate wetlands. 147 However,
some courts, including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, have
interpreted the SWANCC opinion more broadly. 148
To summarize the state of the law at the time Gerke Excavating was
decided, there are two main points. First, Commerce Clause
jurisprudence had evolved to a point where regulation had to fall within
at least one of three categories in order to be constitutionally valid: (1)
channels of commerce; (2) instrumentalities, persons or things in
commerce; or (3) activities that substantially affect commerce. Second,
the extent of federal jurisdiction over wetlands had been called into
question after the Lopez decision. The Court’s SWANCC opinion
resolved the issue of the “migratory bird rule,” but left one very
important question unanswered—specifically, just how substantial of a
connection between regulated wetlands and interstate navigable waters is
required for the federal government to sustain that regulation under the
commerce power.
III. UNITED STATES V. GERKE EXCAVATING, INC.
Following prior Seventh Circuit interpretation, 149 the Gerke court
permitted the federal government to assert jurisdiction over wetlands
with a very tenuous connection to any navigable waters—wetlands
“drained by a ditch that runs into a nonnavigable creek that runs into [a]
nonnavigable . . . [r]iver, which in turn runs into [a navigable river].” 150
Gerke Excavating had “dumped dredged stumps, and roots, plus sand-

147. See, e.g., Gerke, 412 F.3d 804; Carabell, 391 F.3d 704; United States v. Rapanos, 376
F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005); United States v. Reuth Dev. Co., 335
F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); Headwaters, Inc. v.
Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
148. See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The CWA and the OPA are
not so broad as to permit the federal government to impose regulations over ‘tributaries’ that are
neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable waters.”); Rice v. Harken Exploration
Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001); FD&P Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d
509, 516 (D.N.J. 2003) (“[A] ‘significant nexus’ must constitute more than a mere ‘hydrological
connection.’”); United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Va. 2002). For a more
thorough discussion of the varying interpretations of the CWA, see Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
What Are “Navigable Waters” Subject to Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251
et seq.), 160 A.L.R. FED. 585 (2000).
149. Reuth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598. In Reuth, the Seventh Circuit upheld federal jurisdiction
over wetlands “adjacent to an unnamed tributary to Dyer Ditch, which flows north to Hart Ditch,
which flows north to the Little Calumet River, which is a navigable water of the United States.” Id.
at 600.
150. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805.
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based fill” into wetland portions of a 5.8 acre tract. Because Gerke did
not first obtain a permit from the Corps, its actions violated the CWA. 151
Gerke argued that the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over the wetlands
in question “exceed[ed] the authority granted the Corps of Engineers by
the Clean Water Act,” or, in the alterative, that “if the regulation [was]
within the congressional grant of authority, then it exceed[ed] the
authority that the Commerce Clause . . . grants Congress.” 152 The case
was analyzed in light of its inherent constitutional argument because, as
explained before, the statutory and constitutional arguments “are
interchangeable.” 153
The court began its analysis with a brief discussion of the language
of the regulation in question. As explained above, 154 the Corps enacted
regulations extending federal jurisdiction over “wetlands adjacent to”
any other waters covered in the regulation. 155 The court acknowledged
the difficulty of applying the term “adjacent” to wetlands connected to a
navigable river through a series of tributaries, 156 but went no further
because Gerke did “not argue that the regulation is inapplicable to this
case.” 157 The court indirectly analyzed the meaning of “adjacent” in the
remainder of its opinion but did not focus on how the meaning of the
word fit into the constitutional analysis.
The court next discussed the “navigable waters doctrine,” 158 which
permits Congress to regulate “waterways used to transport people and
goods in interstate or foreign commerce” 159 and was established nearly
two-hundred years ago in Gibbons v. Ogden. 160 It pointed out that
wetlands “supply some of the water in navigable waterways,” and
151. Id.
152. Id. at 806.
153. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text.
155. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (2005).
156. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805. The court explained as follows:
The Lemonweir River is thus a tributary of a navigable river, but are the wetlands
“adjacent” to the Lemonweir? They are connected to it in the sense that water from the
wetlands flows into the river, but they might be thought “adjacent” not to the river but
merely to the ditch, and a ditch is not what one would ordinarily understand as a
“tributary.” The Wisconsin River, because it flows into the Mississippi, is connected to
the Gulf of Mexico, but it would be odd to describe it as “adjacent” to the gulf.
Id.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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although “filling in a 5.8 acre tract . . . is not going to have a measurable
effect . . . Congress must be able to regulate an entire class of acts if the
class affects commerce, even if no individual act has a perceptible
effect.” 161 The court never explicitly stated which of the three categories
of permissible regulation this fell into, but appeared to be applying the
substantial effects test because the primary cases it cited for its above
proposition were cases applying the substantial effects test. 162 Gerke did
cite two cases “with specific reference to the regulation of navigable
waters,” one of which was explicitly applying a channels of commerce
analysis. 163 However, the court gave these two cases no special
emphasis and appeared to be citing them merely for their support of the
idea that Congress can regulate “an entire class of acts if the class affects
commerce.” 164
The court stated that part of this power to regulate an entire class of
activities includes the authority to “forbid the pollution of navigable
waters even if the pollution has no effect on navigability.” 165 Further
drawing on this principle, the court quickly concluded that Congress can
regulate wetlands “if water from the wetlands enters a stream that flows
into the navigable waterway,” and it matters not “[w]hether the wetlands
are 100 miles from a navigable waterway or 6 feet.” 166 The court’s
conclusion included a very brief reply to the argument that so much of
the United States is wetlands, and allowing federal jurisdiction would
lead to frequent encroachment upon state power and necessarily violate
principles of federalism. The court responded by stating that the
argument “is two-edged” because the more wetlands that exist, the more
impact they will have on interstate navigable waters. 167
To summarize, the court began with the proposition that Congress
can regulate channels of commerce, including navigable waters. The
court then cited the principle drawn from the substantial effects test,
which is that even when an activity taken alone is outside the reach of the
commerce power, the federal government can regulate that activity if it
161. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806 (citing, inter alia, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205–07
(2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187,
188–90 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1997)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 806–07 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 706–07 (4th Cir.
2003); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525–26 (1941)).
164. Id. at 806.
165. Id. at 807 (“In fact navigability is a red herring from the standpoint of constitutionality.”).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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falls within a larger class of activities that falls within the commerce
power. The court connected these two principles and held that the Corps
could assert jurisdiction over wetlands as part of its overall regulation of
navigable interstate waters, but the court did not explain exactly how or
why these two principles could work together. Part IV will explain in
more detail why this analysis was inadequate.
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Gerke court arrived at the correct holding, it did so
using an abbreviated application of the substantial effects test as applied
to channels of commerce. This Part first explains why the court’s
reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. It then shows how the Necessary and Proper
Clause can augment the reach of the Commerce Clause—as gleaned
from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gonzales—to properly
include wetlands such as those in Gerke.
A. The Gerke Opinion
This Section argues that the analysis in Gerke was inadequate for
two main reasons. First, the opinion does not address the fact that the
plain language of the CWA and the Commerce Clause does not support
federal jurisdiction over wetlands with only a tenuous connection to
waters that are navigable-in-fact. Second, the opinion incorrectly applies
the substantial effects test to the facts at bar, failing to consider the
elements of the test as articulated by the Supreme Court. 168
1. The plain language of the CWA and the Commerce Clause
In illustrating why the Commerce Clause alone could not support
federal jurisdiction over the wetlands in Gerke, this Note’s analysis
begins with an examination of why the plain language of the CWA and
the Commerce Clause do not support such jurisdiction. The United States
Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce.” 169
One modern definition of “Commerce” is “[t]he exchange of goods,
productions, or property of any kind; especially, exchange on a large

168. See discussion supra Part II.A.6.b.
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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scale, as between states or nations; extended trade.” 170 Justice Thomas
summarized what the Framers’ definition might have been as “selling,
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.” 171
The common thread running between these definitions is that
“commerce” involves transactions or some sort of activity directly
related to those transactions. Arguably, it is a stretch, albeit a small one,
to extend this power to actual channels of commerce such as rivers and
roads. Case law has firmly extended commerce jurisdiction over
channels of commerce, 172 but the language of the Constitution must be
stretched appreciably to expand that jurisdiction to include tributaries of
those channels. The plain language of the Commerce Clause must be
stretched even further in applying the commerce power to “wetlands
[that] are drained by a ditch that runs into a nonnavigable creek that runs
into [a] nonnavigable . . . [r]iver, which in turn runs into [a navigable
river].” 173 Filling wetlands without a permit—which the CWA forbids—
is not inherently economic, and its relation to actual channels of
commerce is no more direct than its connection to economic activity.
Because the CWA applies to “[w]etlands adjacent to [navigable
waters],” 174 the specific inquiry becomes: How far can one stretch the
meaning of “adjacent,” and “commerce” along with it? The Fifth Circuit
articulated a narrow conception of “adjacent,” stating that “both the
regulatory and plain meaning of ‘adjacent’ mandate a significant
measure of proximity. Therefore, including all ‘tributaries’ as ‘navigable
waters’ would . . . extend the OPA 175 beyond the limits set forth in

170. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 536
(1963).
171. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
Calvin H. Johnson, The Panda’s Thumb: The Modest and Mercantilist Original Meaning of the
Commerce Clause, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6 (2004) (eschewing dictionary documents in
favor of “samples” taken from early usage: “In the constitutional debates, ‘regulation of commerce’
was most importantly a cover of words for the program of nationalizing the state ‘imposts’ or taxes
on imports.”).
172. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807; SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 181 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“By 1972, Congress’ Commerce Clause power over ‘navigation’ had long since been established.”
(citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
713 (1865); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824))).
173. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806.
174. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(7) (2005).
175. OPA is the Oil Pollution Act and, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, is “co-extensive
with the definition found in the Clean Water Act.” In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 344 (5th Cir.
2003).
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SWANCC.” 176 The Gerke conception of “adjacent” includes, essentially,
wetlands that drain into tributaries of tributaries of navigable waters. 177
This interpretation requires a significant stretch of the meanings of both
“commerce” and “adjacent.” Not only does it run contrary to the plain
language of the CWA and the Commerce Clause, but it also fails to
address the Supreme Court’s suggestion in SWANCC that a “‘significant
nexus’ between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’” exist before the
Corps can assert jurisdiction over those wetlands. 178 The opinion glosses
over the weakness of the connection between the wetlands filled in
Gerke and the navigable-in-fact waters to which those wetlands are
connected, selectively citing precedent from other circuits that supports
the conclusion. 179
2. Substantial effects test incorrectly applied to the CWA
The next major flaw in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is the poorly
supported 180 and ambiguous 181 application of the substantial effects test
to the CWA. 182 In SWANCC, the Court stated that nothing in “the
legislative history [of the CWA] . . . signifies that Congress intended to
exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation.” 183 In
other words, Congress was using its authority here to regulate channels
of commerce, not to regulate activities that substantially affect

176. Id. at 347 n.12. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
177. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805. Other circuits have adopted this broad view of “adjacent.” See
United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 450–53 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414
(2005); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 704–12 (4th Cir. 2003).
178. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
179. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807 (citing Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 450–53; Deaton, 332 F.3d at 704–
12).
180. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (declining to analyze the “migratory bird rule”
under the substantial effects test); Baumgartner, supra note 132, at 2145 (“SWANCC’s narrow
construction of the CWA, and its term ‘navigable waters,’ necessarily precludes federal jurisdiction
on the basis of a substantial effect on commerce.”); see also infra note 185 and accompanying text.
181. The application of the substantial effects test in Gerke is not explicit but is manifest in the
court’s statement that “[t]he sum of many small interferences with commerce can be large, and so to
protect commerce Congress must be able to regulate an entire class of acts if the class affects
commerce, even if no individual act has a perceptible effect.” Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806 (citations
omitted). In addition, the two Supreme Court cases to which the Seventh Circuit cites support the
above proposition, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), are cases that focus on the substantial effects test and have nothing to do with channels of
commerce or navigable water.
182. See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text.
183. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3 (emphasis added).
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commerce. SWANCC further explained that the CWA’s reference to
navigable waters
was of “limited import” . . . . [However, t]he term “navigable” has at
least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its
authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters
that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so
made. 184

The fact that the CWA claims jurisdiction over navigable waters
suggests that the CWA’s Commerce Clause jurisdiction is tied to
channels of commerce, rather than to activities that substantially affect
commerce. 185 This interpretation makes sense particularly in light of the
substantial effects doctrine articulated in Lopez, Morrison, and
Gonzales. 186
3. Elements of the substantial effects test not properly considered
Even assuming that the substantial effects test can be correctly
applied to channels of commerce, the Seventh Circuit’s application is
flawed because it does not adequately address considerations that the
Supreme Court has incorporated into the test. First, the very authority
that the court cites (at the Supreme Court level) describes Congress’s
power not as the authority to regulate any activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce, but as the authority to regulate economic
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 187
Beyond the court’s failure to even consider this factor, it is difficult
to argue that filling wetlands is “economic activity.” 188 Granted, filling

184. Id. at 172.
185. See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 709 (4th Cir. 2003) (“SWANCC, of course,
emphasized that the CWA is based on Congress’s power over navigable waters.”).
186. See discussion supra Part II.A.6.b.
187. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005) (holding that Congress can prohibit
intrastate marijuana cultivation under the CSA because “[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez and
Morrison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic”); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (“Even
Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone
does not.” (emphasis added)).
188. See Deaton, 332 F.3d at 706 (upholding the CWA as applied to wetlands because, in part,
“Congress’s power over the channels of interstate commerce, unlike its power to regulate activities
with a substantial relation to interstate commerce, reaches beyond the regulation of activities that are
purely economic in nature”); Adler, supra note 10, at 35 (“The filling of intrastate, isolated wetlands
. . . is not inherently economic or commercial in nature.”). But see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 193
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wetlands may be in preparation of economic activity such as operating a
commercial structure to be built on the land that is being filled.
Alternatively, filling wetlands may be considered economic in that a
landowner pays an excavating company to do the filling. But the activity
itself is not inherently economic.
Importantly, however, the same analogies that would justify
classifying wetland “reclamation” as economic would have sufficed for
gun possession in Lopez. 189 Guns are articles of commerce that can be
bought and sold. Yet the Supreme Court found that the statute
prohibiting the possession of guns in a school zone “by its terms has
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms.” 190 In other words,
possessing guns, like filling wetlands, is an activity that is not inherently
economic.
Second, the court fails to take into account or even acknowledge the
fact that the Corps’ regulation of “adjacent” wetlands lacks a
jurisdictional element 191 that “might limit its reach to a discrete set of
[waters] that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on
interstate commerce.” 192 In fact, the Corps’ regulation extending
jurisdiction to “adjacent” wetlands broadens federal reach outside of its
clear jurisdiction over navigable interstate waters. Although the Supreme
Court did not address the jurisdictional element in its most recent
commerce analysis in Gonzales, “such a jurisdictional element would
lend support to the argument that [the regulation] is sufficiently tied to
interstate commerce.” 193
Third, the court does not inquire into congressional or administrative
findings of fact detailing the effects of filling “wetlands [that] are drained
by a ditch that runs into a nonnavigable creek that runs into [a]
nonnavigable . . . [r]iver, which in turn runs into [a navigable river].” 194
(“[T]he discharge of fill material into the Nation’s waters is almost always undertaken for economic
reasons.”).
189. 514 U.S. at 549.
190. Id. at 561.
191. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
192. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
562). The basic provisions of the Corps’ interpretation of “navigable waters” include very explicit
jurisdictional elements. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(3) (2005). However, the restrictive language in
those provisions is significantly broadened by provisions that expand jurisdiction to tributaries and
adjacent wetlands. Id. § 328.3(a)(5), (7).
193. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
194. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Not only is there no explanation of the absence of any factual findings,
but there is also no discussion of possible ways in which Congress could
have even rationally concluded 195 that such filling affects interstate
commerce. In other words, the Seventh Circuit did not even apply the
minimum standard of scrutiny as to this element.
Finally, even assuming that filling wetlands constitutes “economic”
activity that can be regulated so long as it exerts a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, the Seventh Circuit did not articulate what that
substantial effect is. Again, even under a “rational basis” standard of
review, a court should articulate what Congress might have rationally
believed the substantial effects could be. 196 Moreover, in describing
what effects an activity has on interstate commerce, the types of effects
listed have generally been, for lack of a better term, economic effects. 197
Gerke characterizes the effects of wetland filling as “pollution of
navigable waters.” 198 At first glance, this makes some sense because one
can imagine, for example, Congress having the power to prohibit
individuals from dumping toxic chemicals into wetlands, where the
chemicals would inevitably find their way into rivers that exist as major
channels of interstate commerce or that contribute to the water supply of
multiple states.
What the argument misses, however, is that the CWA defines the
term “pollutants” so as to include materials such as rock, sand, and tree
stumps that are merely used as fill, 199 and that were exactly the type of
“pollutants” at issue in Gerke. 200 Again, the opinion does not explicitly
explain what effect, economic or not, these materials have on interstate
commerce. Rather, it simply concluded,
[I]t doesn’t matter whether . . . the effect may be to reduce water
levels in navigable waterways . . . or that the effect may be to
increase the level of pollution in such waters by reducing the
195. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211–15 (2005).
197. See id. at 2215 (“Congress could have rationally concluded that the aggregate impact on
the national market of all the transactions exempted from federal supervision is unquestionably
substantial.” (emphasis added)); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 126–29 (1942) (“Congress may
properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the
scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to
stimulate trade therein at increased prices.” (emphasis added)).
198. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807.
199. 33 U.S.C. 1362(6) (2005).
200. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805.
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supply of unpolluted wetlands water. . . . [T]he wetlands are
“waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Act. 201
Even if the “pollution” in Gerke actually affected interstate
commerce, the nexus between the activity in question and interstate
commerce was very thin. The defendant in Gerke filled wetlands that
drain into a tributary—of a tributary—of a navigable river. To sustain
federal regulation based on the Commerce Clause alone, a court “would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States” 202 and subscribe to the
“view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local in the activities of commerce.” 203 In other
words, permitting federal commerce jurisdiction on the basis of a remote
chain of causation would allow the Commerce Clause to swallow the
rule that federal power is limited and enumerated. The Supreme Court
has explicitly rejected the view “that Congress may regulate
noneconomic activity based solely on the effect that it may have on
interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences.” 204 This is
perhaps the strongest reason why the substantial effects test cannot
support federal wetland jurisdiction.
4. Gerke improperly addresses the dual sovereignty argument
The Seventh Circuit also sidestepped the federalism argument that
“wetlands of the United States are so extensive that the Corps’
interpretation will tilt the balance between federal and state power too
far.” 205 This argument would apply a fortiori to the Gerke court’s
conception, stemming from its definition of “adjacent,” because “all
water is connected in some way.” 206 The court concludes its opinion
declaring that “‘adjacent’ can just mean ‘connected.’” 207

201. Id. at 807 (citations omitted).
202. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
203. Id. at 567 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554
(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)).
204. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564–66.
205. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807.
206. Gartner
Lee,
Water
Sector
(2003),
http://www.gartnerlee.com/sectors/
index.cfm?fuseaction=Sectorinformation&SectorID=35&mainSector=6.
207. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 808.
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In analyzing the federalism issue, the Lopez court emphasized the
fact that criminal law is a traditional state function. 208 Similarly, the
SWANCC court recognized that “[r]egulation of land use [is] a function
traditionally performed by local governments.” 209 In Gerke, the
defendant argued that wetlands “are so extensive” that federal regulation
would impose upon state sovereignty. 210 The Seventh Circuit addressed
the point with the brief explanation that “[t]he argument . . . is twoedged. The more extensive the wetlands, the greater their potential
importance as a source of water to keep the navigable waterways full and
clean.” 211 The court’s statement, however, misses the point. Federalism
is not a question of how substantially an activity is connected to
interstate commerce, but of “whether an Act of Congress invades the
province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.” 212
Nevertheless, federal wetland regulation does not pose the same
powerful implications of federalism concerns that have been deemed
important enough to impose limits on that regulation, 213 especially in
light of the more recent federalism analyses in the “anti-commandeering”
cases. 214 Gerke did not come to the wrong conclusion regarding
federalism, but it failed to adequately support its conclusion. As the next
Section will explain, federal regulation of wetlands is a legitimate
exercise of the commerce power as an essential part of a larger
scheme. 215 Therefore, whatever role federalism still plays in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, it will not be likely to impose external limitations
on federal environmental legislation that can overcome the inherent
limits of enumerated powers.

208. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
209. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)).
210. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807.
211. Id.
212. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).
213. See Baumgartner, supra note 132, at 2150, 2156–57 (“The channels-of-commerce power
is plenary and is given great deference by the Court because it does not raise the important
federalism concerns that regulation of an intrastate activity affecting commerce does.”).
214. The two cases generally referred to as “anti-commandeering” cases are New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. at 174 (striking provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
because Congress cannot force states to “take title to and possession of low level radioactive
waste”), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring as unconstitutional portions of
the Brady Act that imposed obligations on state law enforcement agencies). See Edward Rubin, The
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2084 (2005).
215. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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5. Touching upon the correct rationale
Without giving any explicit reasons, the Seventh Circuit stated that
“Congress must be able to regulate an entire class of acts if the class
affects commerce, even if no individual act has a perceptible effect.” 216
As Section B will explain, this idea is right on target. It may be that the
court was proposing precisely the same analysis as this Note. However,
the bare statement of this proposition does not cure the defects of the
opinion because the court neither explains the significance nor the source
of this principle. Had the court adequately laid a foundation and applied
this principle, the opinion could have been a model for other courts to
uphold federal wetland regulations.
B. A Tenable Basis for Federal Wetland Regulation
This Section will explain the rationale upon which federal wetland
regulation can be properly upheld. The idea begins with Justice Scalia’s
proposition that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress, under
the substantial effects test, to regulate noneconomic intrastate activities
that fall within a “larger regulation of economic activity.” 217 This
Section explains that, by analogy, Congress can regulate noneconomic
intrastate activity when that regulation is an essential part of a larger
regulation of channels of commerce. In Gerke, the court’s upholding of
federal jurisdiction over wetlands could not have been adequately
supported by the Commerce Clause alone. 218 This Note now considers
how the holding in Gerke could have been properly supported.
1. Justice Scalia’s conception applied to wetland regulation
The interplay between the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause, at least as interpreted by Justice Scalia, provides a way to
put federal wetland regulation on a firm constitutional foundation. As
explained in Part II, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gonzales
focused on the relationship between the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause: “[U]nlike the channels, instrumentalities,
and agents of commerce, activities that substantially affect commerce are
not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to

216. Gerke, 412 F.3d at 806 (citing, inter alia, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205–07
(2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942)).
217. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
218. See supra Part IV.A.
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regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone,” but must
also draw upon the Necessary and Proper Clause. 219 This allows
Congress to regulate noneconomic intrastate activities as long as they are
indispensable to a larger scheme of interstate economic regulation. By
analogy, if Congress can regulate noneconomic activities that are
essential to a larger regulatory scheme by virtue of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, then it should be able to regulate nonnavigable waters that
are essential to the larger regulatory scheme involving navigable
waters. 220
Wetlands and noneconomic activities are both, when taken in
isolation, outside even Chief Justice Marshall’s broad commerce
umbrella. Despite the fact that the Commerce Clause “comprehends
navigation,” 221 many wetlands are simply not navigable. Similarly,
noneconomic activity does not, by its very definition, involve the types
of transactions that constitute “commerce.” However, the particular
regulation of certain noneconomic activities may be an indispensable
part of an interstate regulatory scheme that would be “undercut” in the
absence of such particular regulation. 222
For example, the prohibition of intrastate possession of marijuana,
whether or not of economic nature in itself, is a necessary part of “a
comprehensive framework for regulating the production, distribution . . .
and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and
lucrative, interstate market.” 223 A lucrative interstate market is a class of
economic activity that Congress clearly has the power to regulate. 224 In
such a case, the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to
regulate particular intrastate activities falling within that larger class
because “the constitution must allow to the national legislature that
discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are
to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the

219. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215–16 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). The
dissent also recognizes the significant role played by the Necessary and Proper Clause: “This power
[to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce] derives from the conjunction of
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Id. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
220. See United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325, 1327 (6th Cir.
1974) (invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause in support of its upholding the CWA).
221. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
222. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 657 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
223. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2205–15 (majority
opinion).
224. Id. at 2211.
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high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
people.” 225 In other words, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives
Congress authority in addition to its enumerated powers when that
authority is necessary to carry out those enumerated powers and duties.
The Necessary and Proper Clause allows a court to go beyond the
question of whether a particular activity falls within the commerce power
and to pursue the broader inquiry of whether the particular activity falls
within a class of activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 226
As with the regulation of intrastate marijuana possession as a
necessary component of national controlled substance regulation, the
regulation of intrastate wetlands is a necessary part of the overall scheme
of interstate water regulation. The relevant inquiry begins by asking:
What is the overall scheme? The preamble to the CWA states that “[t]he
objective of this [Act] is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 227 The question then
becomes whether this is a “legitimate end” 228 that can be supported by
the Necessary and Proper Clause and whether the regulation in question
is essential to that scheme.
The importance of federal environmental regulation has certainly
been recognized and is, by almost any standard, a legitimate end. 229
Around the time the CWA was enacted, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals observed,
Obviously water pollution is a health threat to the water supply of the
nation. It endangers our agriculture by rendering water unfit for
irrigation. It can end the public use and enjoyment of our magnificent
rivers and lakes for fishing, for boating, and for swimming. These
health and welfare concerns are, of course, proper subjects for

225. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
226. See Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2215; id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Although this
power . . . commonly overlaps with the authority to regulate economic activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce, and may in some cases have been confused with that authority, the two
are distinct.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing, but acknowledging that
the Court “ask[s] whether the class of activities as a whole substantially affects interstate commerce,
not whether any specific activity within the class has such effects when considered in isolation”).
227. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
228. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
229. See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174–80 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States
v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). But see Adler, supra note 188, at 62–
67 (questioning the efficacy of the CWA); Adler, supra note 13, at 464–65 (advocating the
decentralization of environmental regulation).
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Congressional attention because of their many impacts upon interstate
commerce generally. 230

This shows that even in 1974, the nation’s water was recognized as an
issue of national concern. More recently, one commentator has pointed
out that the issue of interstate water pollution “poses the identical
problem that gave rise to the need for an exclusive federal power over
interstate commerce in the first place,” which is the situation where
individual state regulation is insufficient, and collective action is
necessary. 231 In addition, the validity of federal regulation of actual
channels of commerce has been established by almost two centuries of
case law. 232 More specifically, the validity of the CWA as a whole has
been recognized by the Supreme Court for more than three decades. 233
With the legitimacy of the overall scheme established, the final
inquiry becomes whether the regulation of the intrastate activity is an
essential part of that overall scheme “in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” 234 A
court must ask whether the overall scheme would fail if the regulation in
question were not sustained. In a sense, this exposes an apparent fallacy
in the “class of activities” theory because the inquiry examines,
essentially, how intrastate wetlands substantially affect interstate
commerce. Nevertheless, the specific inquiry would not be proper if the
broader inquiry could not be satisfied. Moreover, wetland regulation
calls for the Necessary and Proper Clause to be applied to channels of
commerce, rather than to activities that substantially affect commerce.
Regulation of wetlands is essential to the overall regulation of
navigable waters. The effects of wetlands on the nation’s waters are
numerous and extensive. 235 First, and perhaps most importantly,
wetlands act as filters that absorb and neutralize harmful chemicals and
microorganisms in water. 236 The Supreme Court and Congress have
230. Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d at 1325.
231. Baumgartner, supra note 132, at 2161.
232. See sources cited supra note 172.
233. See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d 1317.
234. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
235. See supra note 111.
236. HASLAM, supra note 111, at 166–77; KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 5–6; LEWIS,
supra note 111, at 49–60; Holman, supra note 24, at 205 (“The [wetlands] . . . of the American
landscape are the primary pollution control systems of the nation’s water, and the primary
determinants of their water quality.”); Johnson, supra note 111, at 71; Environmentalists Challenge
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recognized the need to protect the nation’s interstate water system from
wetlands connected to that system because “[w]ater moves in hydrologic
cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source.” 237 This goes directly to the heart of the CWA’s primary
objective “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 238 Furthermore, wetlands provide
floodwater storage for times of high water and slowly release that water
in drier times. 239 Wetlands adjacent to large rivers, lakes, and oceans
provide upland areas with a barrier against erosion. 240 In addition to the
CWA goals that wetlands serve, wetlands provide many benefits that
could potentially fall within the goals of other federal regulatory
schemes, such as the Endangered Species Act. 241 In sum, “[t]he Clean
Water Act could not achieve its purpose without such an expansive
interpretation of navigability because big waters collect from small
waters. The nature of the drainage network, rather than legal principles,
forces the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act to encompass
wetlands.” 242
2. Some additional concerns
Allowing Congress to regulate wetlands simply because they fall
within the broader scheme of interstate navigable waters regulation raises
some questions. As Justice O’Connor pointed out, this principle could
turn Lopez into a “drafting guide” that encourages Congress to legislate
more broadly in order to extend the depth of its reach into intrastate
affairs. 243 In other words, if Congress had a question about the validity
of an individual regulation, it could just write the statute more broadly to
ensure that its desired piece of legislation would be upheld.
Bush’s
Earth
Day
Announcement,
BushGreenwatch,
Apr.
23,
2004,
http://www.bushgreenwatch.org/mt_archives/000103.php.
237. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1972), as
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742).
238. CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“The ‘major purpose’ of the CWA was ‘to establish a comprehensive long-range
policy for the elimination of water pollution.’” (citation omitted)).
239. HASLAM, supra note 111, at 24; KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 5; Johnson, supra
note 111, at 71.
240. KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 5.
241. HASLAM, supra note 111, at 25; KUSLER & OPHEIM, supra note 111, at 6.
242. LEWIS, supra note 111, at 10; see also United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir.
2003).
243. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

300

6LEE.FIN.DOC

263]

5/12/2006 12:32:52 PM

Federal Wetland Jurisdiction in Gerke Excavating

Alternatively, wherever possible, Congress could simply attach its
questionable legislation to larger “pre-existing schemes” in order to
achieve justification. 244 As to the first concern, one must remember that
although an essential part of a larger scheme of regulation will be upheld,
Congress still must justify the larger scheme as being within its power. If
the larger scheme is unconstitutional, the individual components will not
survive. 245 If, however, the larger scheme is a legitimate exercise of
congressional power, then it should not be objectionable to preserve
legislation that is essential to the efficacy of that scheme.
As to the second concern, allowing Congress to enact legislation
because it falls within a broader scheme does not rob the courts of their
power to strike that legislation where Congress has ingenuously alleged
the connection. In the case of pre-existing schemes, it will be all the
more difficult for Congress to effectively justify that its new legislation
is “essential” to that scheme, simply by virtue of the fact that the scheme
will have survived thus far without the proposed addition. In sum, the
fact that the overall scheme must be legitimate and that no piece of
legislation can ride on the coattails of that scheme without being
“essential” to the scheme will ensure that the federal government does
not “effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government.” 246
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit happened to get the correct outcome in Gerke
but based the holding on inadequate rationale. A thorough examination
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence reveals that because wetlands are an
indispensable part of the larger scheme of regulating navigable waters,
and because the CWA regulates a class of activities within Congress’s
reach under its channels-of-commerce power, federal regulation of
intrastate wetlands does not exceed the Constitution’s grant of commerce
power. Lopez, Morrison, and Gonzales did not herald the fall of federal

244. Id.
245. For an application of this limitation, see GDF Realty Investments., Ltd. v. Norton, where
the Fifth Circuit refused to extend this principle to the Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. 93-205, 87
Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000)), as applied to a certain
cave insect because it lacked evidence that “any take of a Cave Species is (a) part of a larger
‘economic’ regulatory scheme [or] (b) so essential to the larger national scheme that the accidental
crushing of one Cave Species underfoot . . . threatens to undo the national program.” 362 F.3d 286,
290–91 (5th Cir. 2004).
246. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
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environmental statutes but, rather, the honest examination of these
statutes. Gerke is a prime example of the problem and the judicial
attitude toward this issue.
With the federal courts of appeal in disagreement, and owners of
wetland property in a state of uncertainty, the issue is ripe for Supreme
Court review. 247 The judiciary holds the highest duty of care in
interpreting our Constitution clearly and candidly. While it is certainly
laudable for a court to reach the right result in a case, our system of law
requires explicit and correct reasoning as well so that judges have
guidance for their decisions and so that everyone else has guidance for
their conduct. This is especially important in cases that define the limits
of the power of the government, for as Hamilton stated,
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that
every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the
commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act
therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would
be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant
is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior
to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do
not only what their powers do not authorise, but what they forbid. 248

Joshua L. Lee

247. Two such cases are set for review in the 2005–06 term: Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005); United States v. Rapanos,
376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005).
248. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).

302

